INTRODUCTION
Among the 1.6 million acres of southern California's Mojave National Preserve stands a small cross, erected nearly a century ago as a memorial to veterans who died in World War I. Located in a remote site in the desert atop 1 an outcropping known as Sunrise Rock, the cross, standing between five and eight feet tall, may appear to be of little significance to the average passerby. 2 However, this seemingly inconsequential monument may have substantial implications for the federal government's ability to transfer land to private entities. The location of the cross in the federally-owned Preserve has sparked widespread debate over whether it violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which guarantees that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The Establishment Clause is 3 generally interpreted to guarantee citizens the right to be free from the government's endorsement of a particular religion. Opponents of the cross 4 have sought its removal for more than a decade, arguing that its location on the Preserve constitutes governmental endorsement of Christianity. 5 The case of Salazar v. Buono, which was decided by the United States 6 Supreme Court on April 28, 2010, is a culmination of this decade-long legal battle. The central issue in this case was whether the constitutional violation 7 created by the government's endorsement of a particular religion is meaningfully eradicated by its proposal to transfer ownership of the patch of land on which the cross stands to a private entity. In this case, the government 8 attempted to remedy the constitutional violation by transferring the land to a local veteran's group. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the 9 transfer was valid and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, thereby resolving a split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. 10 The decisions of the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals over the years demonstrate the divide between the two Circuits on this issue. The Seventh Circuit, in cases such as Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, has repeatedly held that, "absent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property conveying a message endorsing religion is an effective way for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion." 11 Thus, absent unusual circumstances, a governmental transaction is presumed to be an effective remedy for an Establishment Clause violation. The Ninth Circuit, however, in the Buono line of cases, has viewed such transactions with greater scrutiny and has declined to adopt such a presumption when this type of case arises. Proponents of the Ninth Circuit's views on this issue cite 12 federal government can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another). Circuit's holdings, on the other hand, demonstrate concern over the Ninth Circuit's supposed disregard of binding Supreme Court precedent, and also point to the potential implications that a restriction on the government's ability to transfer land that it owns may have for the private land owners engaged in such transactions. Thus, the particular type of transaction at issue in Salazar 14 v. Buono raises First Amendment as well as private property concerns. In rendering a decision in Salazar v. Buono, therefore, the Court was faced with the task of effectively balancing these two important competing interests.
This comment begins with a discussion of the historical background of and rationale for the Establishment Clause, and continues with an examination of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Clause from the twentieth through the twenty-first century. Circuit in dealing with these types of cases, particularly by examining the Buono cases, the line of cases leading up to the Salazar v. Buono. Part II C. discusses the Supreme Court's ruling in Salazar v. Buono. In Part III, the comment analyzes the competing interests at stake in the Seventh and Ninth Circuit approaches, their relative importance, and the balance that must be struck by the Court in order to adequately address both concerns.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution reads,"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. determining whether the statutes in question fostered an excessive entanglement with religion, the Court examined "the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." The Court struck down both statutes and based its 33 holding on a number of factors, including the duty of the Rhode Island schools' teachers to stimulate interest in religious vocations and missionary work; the fact that the Pennsylvania statute provided state financial aid directly to church-related schools; the requirement that both states examine church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
27. (The Pennsylvania statute authorized reimbursement to nonpublic schools for teachers' salaries who taught secular materials in such schools, while the Rhode Island statute provided a fifteen percent salary supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools at which the average per pupil expenditure on secular education was below the average in public schools. In both states, the majority of these funds were spent on Catholic schools. schools' records in order to determine how much of the total expenditures were attributable to secular education and how much to religious activity; and the divisive political potential of both state programs.
34
The Court revisited the issue several years later in Lynch v. Donnelly, this time examining whether a Christmas display in a public area which contained a Nativity scene violated the Establishment Clause. With its ruling in Lynch, 37. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692. 38. Slaven, supra note 36, at 657. 39. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 669 (holding that "it would be ironic if the inclusion of the crèche in the display, as part of a celebration of an event acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would so 'taint' the exhibition as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol while hymns and carols are sung and played in public places including schools, and while Congress and state legislatures open public sessions with prayers, would be an overreaction contrary to our history and our holdings.").
40 While the varying results reached by the Supreme Court demonstrate the muddled nature of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, disagreement among scholars, over both the requirements imposed by the Establishment Clause and the importance of the doctrine, also helps to illustrate this point. Many scholars advocate a strict separation viewpoint, while emphasizing the continuing importance of the Establishment Clause in our country. One 55 scholar, emphasizing the continuing importance of the Clause, notes that "given the extraordinary religious diversity of our Nation, the Establishment Clause functions to depoliticize religion; it thereby helps to diffuse a potentially explosive situation." Professor Erwin Chemerinsky adheres to a 56 similar viewpoint, arguing that strict separation is desirable because "it is a way of ensuring that we can all feel that it is 'our' government, whatever our religion or lack of religion. If government becomes aligned with a particular religion or religions, those of other beliefs are made to feel like outsiders." 57 This is especially important, Professor Chemerinsky argues, given the fact that today the United States is a far more religiously diverse society than the Framers could have ever imagined.
58
In contrast, several commentators maintain that the Establishment Clause, while requiring some separation, does not require a complete disconnection between church and state. Many commentators and religious leaders 59 maintain an even more extreme attitude opposing separation, by downplaying the significance of the Establishment Clause and insisting that the United 53. Id. at 861 (holding that examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation for every American appellate court, and governmental purpose is a key element of a good deal of constitutional doctrine in twelve-inch block letters, "Christ Guide Us On Our Way." After accepting 67 the gift, the city of Marshfield placed the statue in an undeveloped, city-owned property known as Wildwood Park. Thirty-nine years later, in 1998, a local 68 businessman and member of the Freedom from Religion Foundation objected to the presence of the statue on public property and requested that the city move the statue to private property. The city refused this request, and 69 eventually the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking injunctive relief. After the lawsuit was filed, the city sold a small section of the park to 70 a private group of Marshfield citizens in order to circumvent any potential constitutional violations.
71
After the district court granted summary judgment to defendants, the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the issue of whether the land sale was an effective remedy for the Establishment Clause violation. Despite the plaintiff's 72 arguments that the transaction was merely a "'sweetheart deal'… concocted to circumvent the government action requirement of the Establishment Clause" and therefore constituted an endorsement of religion by the city, the court found the transaction to be valid, citing the facts that the fund had 65 were no extraordinary circumstances that justified disregarding the sale for the purposes of the city endorsing religion, the court concluded that the city did not engage in government action endorsing religion by selling the property, and thus the transfer was valid. Order of Eagles, which was given permission by the city to install the monument. In 2002, after threats of lawsuits over the monument, the city 77 council of La Crosse agreed to sell the monument to the Eagles along with a twenty-foot by twenty-two-foot parcel of land under and surrounding the monument. Again, the Seventh Circuit found that this transaction lacked any 78 "unusual circumstances," and held that the transaction was a sufficient means of ending the government endorsement of religion. In its majority opinion, 79 the court, citing the Marshfield opinion, provided examples of "the typical sort of improprieties that might cause us to disregard a transaction." Unusual 80 circumstances, according to the court, "would include a sale that did not comply with applicable state law governing the sale of land by a municipality, a sale to a straw purchaser that left the City with continuing power to exercise the duties of ownership, or a sale well below fair market value resulting in a gift to a religious organization." Absent these or any other strange 81 circumstances, the court held the transfer of the land to be an effective method for remedying an Establishment Clause violation.
These circumstance would have to be extremely unusual for the Seventh Circuit to consider it sufficient to terminate an otherwise valid transaction. For example, the court viewed the fact that the cities in both cases did not solicit alternative bids for the lands at issue as inconsequential to the transaction's validity. 82 Based on these rulings, it is apparent that the Seventh Circuit's approach to these types of transactions is to generally uphold a transfer of land to a private entity unless some sort of obvious, egregious misconduct occurs. As this comment will demonstrate in the next section, the Ninth Circuit's approach has given substantially more scrutiny to these types of transactions. The district court, applying the Lemon test, ruled that the presence of the cross on federal land conveys a message of endorsement of religion, and granted summary judgment to Buono and his co-plaintiffs. 84 Prior to this decision, however, Congress designated the cross a national memorial, and allocated federal funding to the NPS for the purpose of installing a memorial plaque at the site. Following the district court's ruling 85 that the statue be removed, Congress passed another law that banned the use of federal dollars to remove the cross, in an attempt to ensure that the court's order was not carried out. The NPS appealed the district court's ruling, and 86 while the appeal was still pending, Congress passed another law requiring the secretary of the interior to transfer ownership of Sunrise Rock and a surrounding acre to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).
B. The Ninth Circuit Approach

87
In 2004, prior to this transfer of the property, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the location of the statue in the Preserve was unconstitutional despite the fact that the cross was erected and maintained 82 by private individuals, and was intended to serve as war memorial. 88 Furthermore, the Court held that the relatively small size of the cross and its remote location are of no consequence to its decision. Despite the short height of the cross, the Court reasoned that this makes it no less likely to project a message of government endorsement to a reasonable observer. Furthermore, 89 the Court held that the cross's remote location was insignificant. The lack of a government-owned building in the vicinity of the cross is irrelevant; the only significant matter is that the cross sits on public park land, which "embod[ies] the notion of government ownership as much as urban parkland, and the remote location of Sunrise Rock does nothing to detract from that notion."
90
Despite the Ninth Circuit affirming that the statue was unconstitutional, the NPS did not remove the statue, but rather took steps to transfer the land to the VFW. This action led Buono to file another lawsuit in district court, this 91 time seeking an injunction on the transfer of the land from the NPS to the VFW. In that case, the district court again declared the statue 92 unconstitutional, and enjoined the NPS from transferring the land. In 93 declaring the transfer invalid, the court determined that unusual circumstances surrounded the transfer. Specifically, the court cited to the fact that the NPS 94 retained a reversionary interest in the property, that the decision to transfer the land did not occur through the normal administrative process, and the history of the government's efforts to preserve and maintain the Sunrise Rock cross as unusual circumstances. 95 Again, the NPS appealed this ruling to the Ninth Circuit, with the same result. In upholding the district court's ruling, the Ninth Circuit considered 96 the same circumstances surrounding the transfer, and concluded that the government engaged in "herculean efforts" to preserve the cross atop Sunrise Rock. Finally, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued an amended opinion, adding 97 a footnote which explained that while the court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's approach of looking at these cases on a transaction by transaction basis, it declined to adopt a presumption of the effectiveness of a land sale to 88 Alito, concurring in part and in the judgment, wrote that the actions taken by Congress were appropriate, noting that the transfer would "eliminate any perception of religious sponsorship stemming from the location of the cross on federally owned land, while at the same time avoiding the disturbing symbolism associated with the destruction of the historic monument." As 101 a result, Justice Alito did not believe that it was necessary to remand the case to the lower court.
102
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented, writing that "[a] Latin cross necessarily symbolizes one of the most important tenets upon which believers in a benevolent Creator, as well as non-believers, are known to differ." While Justice Stevens agreed that "the Nation should 103 memorialize the service of those who fought and died in World War I," he held that "it cannot lawfully do so by continued endorsement of a starkly sectarian message." In Justice Stevens' view, the transfer would not end 104 government endorsement of the cross because "after the transfer it would continue to appear to any reasonable observer that the Government has endorsed the cross," since the government has designated it as a national memorial, and because the purpose of the transfer is to preserve the display of the cross. Given the transfer statute's fundamental inadequacy as a
III. ANALYSIS
In deciding Salazar v. Buono and determining the constitutionality of such transactions, the Court was faced with weighing two major competing interests: upholding and recognizing the continuing importance of the Establishment Clause, versus the potential implications that the ruling could have on the ability to transfer and control property. This comment argues that, while the Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit rationales both have merit, the Court should have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling in this particular case.
In his dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit's most recent Buono decision, Justice O'Scannlain expressed a great deal of concern over the majority's ruling. One of Justice O'Scannlain's concerns is that the Ninth 107 Circuit inappropriately expanded the scope of the "unusual circumstances" test by holding that the government has maintained or will maintain or support the Sunrise Rock cross after the land transfer despite the lack of any evidence indicating that this is the case. Furthermore, the designation of the cross as a national memorial made it one of only forty-nine such memorials in the entire United States. The 116 designation of this small, little-known cross, located in a very remote area and seen by few, as a national memorial when such a designation is relatively rare should have further raised suspicions about the federal government's motives. The combination of all these factors should have been more than enough to, at a minimum, raise suspicion that the government is transferring land for the sole purpose of circumventing the Establishment Clause. While "[u] nusual circumstances that will invalidate a sale include (1) 'a sale to a straw purchaser' leaving the public entity 'with continuing power to exercise the duties of ownership,' (2) 'a sale that does not comply with' applicable law governing the sale of land by a public entity, or (3) a sale well below fair market value resulting in a gift to a religious organization," courts have held that "[a]ll of these unusual circumstances need not exist to invalidate a sale and a court may also consider the existence of other unusual circumstances in this analysis." The Seventh Circuit's unusual circumstances test appears to be an appropriate test in analyzing the validity of these types of transactions. However, the test is completely ineffective unless Courts apply a level of scrutiny to the extent that the Ninth Circuit has. The circumstances in the Buono line of cases were clearly unusual enough to warrant increased scrutiny. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has not inappropriately expanded the test; they have simply carried it out more effectively than the Seventh Circuit and the adherents to the Seventh Circuit approach.
Critics of the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Buono v. Kempthorne also point to the potentially harmful effect that such a ruling could have on the beneficiaries of land in such cases. This argument, while valid, tends to 118 exaggerate the potential harm to private citizen's rights, while de-emphasizing the importance of the separation between church and state. In cases like these, the private citizen often has limited rights as a result of the transaction anyway. "The private beneficiary of the land transfer performs functions normally under the umbrella of the state." In the Buono line of cases, for Some commentators also argue that the Seventh Circuit's approach to cases involving the transfer of land to a private entity is preferable to the Ninth Circuit's because it affords local governments flexibility to remedy Establishment Clause violations with creative solutions. Municipalities 122 today are faced with increasing complexities of governance as America continues to become more religiously and culturally diverse. The Seventh 123 Circuit, by presuming that such transactions are an effective remedy to Establishment Clause violations, allows governments to come up with solutions other than the "take-it-or-leave-it approach to the religious display." This all or nothing approach is often undesirable, as questions of 124 religious displays can generate a tremendous amount of emotion, and thus the removal or keeping of a symbol may create a volatile situation.
125
There is a problem with this argument, however. Increasing the government's flexibility in crafting solutions to Establishment Clause violations would inevitably lead to a potential increase in the government's ability to act favorably toward a particular religion. The government should only be permitted to engage in land transfers to private citizens in the most obviously constitutional situations. Following the Seventh Circuit approach would allow governments to engage in different types of transactions that would increase the potential for abuse. Furthermore, allowing governments flexibility in these types of transactions could have additional negative policy implications. For one, "[a]ny entity desirous of erecting a permanent religious symbol on public land would have what amounts to a court-established right to a piece of the commons." This could open the door for unpopular 126 religious groups to freely erect symbols on public land. Essentially, "carving out public lands into private parcels to appease particular religious groups seems more likely to potentially invite religious tension rather than alleviate it." 127 Based on the aforementioned factors, the Supreme Court should have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Buono v. Kempthorne. The circumstances surrounding the transfer of land from a government entity to a private one need to be thoroughly analyzed, and the particular facts of each and every situation need to be taken into account. In addition to the typical factors examined by the Seventh Circuit in determining whether "unusual circumstances" surrounded a transaction, courts should also take into account factors such as how long the religious symbol in question has been at a particular site, the community attitudes about the symbol, and other factors that may affect a government's tendency to engage in "sham" transactions. These types of factors further help to illuminate the government's rationale behind transferring land to a private entity, and thus help to determine the legitimacy of such transactions.
For example, if a particular religious monument has been an important part of a community for several decades, as the cross at issue in Salazar v. Buono was, and is held by the community members to be an important aspect of the community's identity, a sale of the land containing the monument by the local government to a private entity should be viewed with additional scrutiny. Such a transaction should be subject to additional scrutiny because it would likely be in the local government's best interest to maintain the monument, due to its popularity with citizens. In such a case, therefore, the government's tendency to engage in a "sham" transaction in order to circumvent the Establishment Clause would be at its highest. If it is not in the economic interest of the governmental entity, but merely a way to overcome an Establishment Clause violation, such a transfer should be found to be invalid.
Additionally, the Court should assess the level of actual harm that prohibiting a transfer of land from the government to a private entity would truly have on the private actor. For example, the actual financial burden that the prohibition would create for the private entity, as well as the level of inconvenience of having to bear the burden of the ramifications for the government's violations, should be weighed in these types of cases. It will be up to the reviewing court to examine these transactions on a case-by-case basis and determine whether the interests of the private entity are affected in a significant enough way to justify the transfer of the land from a governmental entity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Establishment Clause retains an important role in our society today. With the ever-increasing religious diversity of the United States comes the continued importance of a strong prohibition against the establishment of law pertaining to religion or the endorsement by the government of any particular religion. While there are many significant interests to be considered in determining the validity of transactions involving the sale of public land
